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The	 current	 public	 image	 of	 Brexit	 is	 of	 a	 British	 Government	 grappling	 internally,	 while	
wresting	with	an	Article	50	negotiation	process	that	is	making	little	headway.	It	 is	perhaps	
































Neither	of	 these	documents,	nor	 the	Prime	Minister’s	proposal	 for	a	 security	 treaty,	have	
triggered	 detailed	 EU	 responses.	 The	 EU27	 position	 has	 been	 to	maintain	 a	 focus	 on	 the	
Article	 50	 process,	 interpreted	 in	 a	 sequenced	 fashion,	 with	 discussions	 on	 a	 future	






institutions	 (with	 differing	 roles	 for	 the	 European	 Commission,	 other	 EU	 agencies	 and	
member	states)	and	based	upon	different	EU	treaty	articles	-	throws	up	similar	complexities	
as	negotiating	a	future	trade	relationship.	For	the	UK	to	seek	the	closest	possible	relationship	
with	the	EU	and	 its	member	states	on	 internal	security,	and	especially	on	 issues	of	crime,	
terrorism	and	borders,	will	mean	particularly	acute	negotiating	challenges	if	the	UK	is	outside	
the	 EU’s	 institutions,	 legal	 order	 and	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ECJ).		








based	 decision-making	 and	 implementation	 structures	 of	 the	 EU’s	 Common	 Foreign	 and	
Security	Policy	 (CFSP)	and	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy	 (CSDP)	present	a	 ‘docking	
problem’	for	a	non-member	state.	Only	member	states	are	members	of	the	EU’s	key	foreign,	






the	 UK	 as	 they	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 sufficient	 influence	 on	 EU	 policy	 formation	 (via	 direct	
participation	in	key	institutions).	They	only	allow	for	signing	up	to	EU	foreign	policy	positions	











Achieving	 such	an	ambitious	goal	depends	on	 two	key	 conditions.	 First,	whether	 the	EU’s	
member	 states	 share	 the	 scale	 of	 ambition	 for	 a	 security	 agreement.	 Second,	 and	more	
crucially,	whether	 the	UK	and	 the	EU	are	able	 to	 reach	 the	exit	 agreement	envisioned	by	
Article	 50	 covering	 the	 UK’s	 exit	 from	 the	 EU	 and	 terms	 for	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	 post-
membership	relationship.		
	









to	be	 reflected	 in	 a	 future	 SDSR	and	NSS.	 The	 current	national	 security	 capability	 review,	
which	looks	at	the	existing	UK	policy	and	the	plans	to	support	implementation	of	the	current	
NSS,	is	a	recognition	of	the	consequences	of	Brexit	for	UK	foreign	and	security	policy.	But	the	













terms	 of	 Article	 50	 on	 31
st
	 March	 2019	 and	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 a	 post-membership	
agreement	to	cover	EU-UK	relations.	Beyond	exiting	the	EU’s	institutions	the	extent	of	the	
other	 characteristics	 of	 transition	 are	 vague,	 although	 for	 most	 commentators	 the	
assumption	is	that	the	UK	would	remain	within	the	EU’s	Customs	Union	and,	by	implication,	
important	 aspects	 of	 the	 EU’s	 external	 relations.	 	 By	 extension,	 transition	 arrangements	
would	be	in	place	covering	foreign,	security	and	defence	policy.		In	this	case	the	EU	would	
need	to	make	a	determination	as	to	the	degree	to	which	it	wished	to	see	the	UK	continue	to	
participate	 in	 EU	policies	 as	 a	 ‘privileged	 partner’	 and	 to	 provide	 the	 necessary	 legal	 and	
political	arrangements	in	anticipation	of	‘final	status’	EU-UK	agreement.	Such	an	arrangement	























structures	of	 foreign	policy	consultation	 in	place	between	the	EU	and	the	UK,	 the	fallback	
would	be	on	 informal	 information	gathering	 in	Brussels	and	seeking	 influence	via	member	







personnel	 would	 likely	 be	 removed	 from	 CSDP	 operations	 in	 third	 countries,	 and	 from	
Brussels	 institutions	such	as	 the	military	committee.	The	Operational	Headquarters	 (OHQ)	
would	no	longer	operate	as	a	facility	available	to	the	EU	and	the	UK	would	leave	the	roster	of	
EU	Battle	Groups.	The	UK	would,	however,	remain	connected	to	the	CSDP	through	the	EU-
NATO	Strategic	Partnership	and	operational	collaboration.		
	
More	generally,	a	hard	Brexit	would,	of	course,	have	implications	for	the	UK’s	wider	bilateral	
and	trilateral	relationships	with	the	remaining	EU	member	states,	other	European	states	and	
outside	Europe.		
	
Conclusion	
Theresa	May’s	ambition	is	for	an	EU-UK	security	treaty	which	positions	UK’s	foreign,	security	
and	deference	policy	as	separate	but	not	separable	from	the	EU.	Such	a	wide-ranging	security	
agreement	is,	however,	a	formidable	undertaking,	and	will	be	conditional	on	agreement	on	
the	future	economic	relationship.		
	
A	less	ambitious,	but	more	attainable	goal,	may	be	to	separate	out	the	various	strands	of	the	
security,	foreign	policy	and	defence	policy	into	separate	agreements.	This	could	be	under	the	
umbrella	of	a	more	widely	drawn	strategic	partnership.	Consideration	also	needs	to	be	given	
to	the	possibility	of	a	hard	Brexit,	and	the	implications	of	dislocation	replacing	the	existing	
embeddedness	of	the	UK	in	the	EU’s	foreign,	security	and	defence	policy.		
	
The	foreign,	security	and	defence	policy	of	the	EU	of	27	member	states	without	the	UK	has	
been	given	no	serious	attention	in	Brussels	or	national	capitals.	With	the	tight	mandate	and	
rigid	negotiating	approach		currently	being	pursued	in	Brussels,	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	the	
current	shared	foreign,	security	and	defence	policy	interests	between	the	EU	and	the	UK	will	
be	saved	from	the	shadow	of	the	broader	dislocation	that	results	from	Brexit.		
	
	
		
